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Abstract
Drawing on institutional theory, the paper aims at improving the understanding
and explanation of the processes of reform of Ghana’s telecom industry as well
as the policy and governance initiatives that have contributed to shaping the
industry today. The research question of the paper is concerned with how
the developments of the policy and governance foundation have affected the
development trends and structures of the telecom industry in Ghana. This
involves a periodization of the different policy and governance initiatives.
The paper identifies two major periods and their various levels of gover-
nance, from the decentral era where management of the sector was vested in the
traditional chiefs followed by the municipalities/districts to the centralization
era where powers were moved to, first, the Works and Housing Department and
later the Ministry of Communications and the regulatory agency in connection
with the liberalization of the sector.
Within the era of liberalization, the paper identifies three main policy
directions: 1) A market liberalization period (1997–2007) where Westel Ltd.
was introduced into the fixed line market and where Spacefon, Celltell
and Mobitel all were introduced to the cellular telephony market; 2) an
infrastructure expansion period starting at the beginning of 2008, where the
overall policy was increasingly directed towards infrastructure development
with infrastructure licensing of international tower companies; and 3) a new
period having started recently from the beginning of 2011 and up to date, with
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policy initiatives being directed at consumer protection and projects such as
mobile number portability and SIM card identification.
The application of institutional theory provides the basis for an improved
understanding of the sector reforms including the identification of poor
performance of the GP&T, strong government manipulation without any
opposition in parliament, weak workers’ unions, and a general policy apathy
as key endogenous factors affecting the reform process, while international
bodies, donor communities and other external agreements constitute important
exogenous factors.
Keywords: Institutional theory, telecom reform, transitional reform, nation-
alization, denationalization.
1 Introduction
Ghana was one of the first African countries to start moving from having a
government controlled telecommunication market to a liberalized and compet-
itive market with well-organized private sector participation. As the industry
moves closer to a fully private and competitive model, the Government has
continued to play an active role in promoting the effective development of the
sector.
Telecom reform, regulation and policies of various African countries have
been subject to intense debate during the last couple of decades (Tobbin,
2010). The telecommunication industry is among the most dynamic industries
in the world and is characterized by a high speed of innovation. Reforms have
naturally become part of its process of growth.
The global pursuant of telecom liberalization and regulatory reform which
started in the 1990s was non-comparable to any technologically led reform
since the beginning of the century and the Ghanaian telecom industry, which
is not often mentioned in literature, was among the frontiers in Africa.
The process of reform particularly in Ghana started with corporatization
through privatization to total liberalization involving competition. Several
researchers have documented different factors that have contributed to telecom
reform. Cowhey (1990, 1999) argued that “revolution in telecommunication
technology” was the motivating factor for the reforms. In the case of Ghana,
Frempong and Atubra (2001), Ahator (2004), and Frempong and Henten
(2005) in their various works on the Ghanaian telecom industry mentioned
institutional factors that have contributed to the reforms by the government.
The most common factor was the performance of the incumbent operator.
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A study by Tobbin (2010) identified the influence of the World Bank and
other international communities, influence of colonial masters, particularly
the United Kingdom (UK), itinerant experts who share a certain view of the
world, public outcry, and agitation or pressure by employees of the Ghana Post
and Telecommunication (GP&T) as the key underlying factors of the telecom
industry reform in Ghana.
Dwelling on the four layer institutional framework by Koppenjan and
Groenewegen (2005), the research of the present paper seeks to provide a
further dimension to the understanding of the reform processes of the Ghana
telecom industry. In addition, the paper seeks to identify the major policy
directions and their periods, starting from pre-reform to the present reform
days. Different approaches to management of the sector are identified, and
a picture of reform activities that have molded the current players and the
market competition of the industry today is put forward.
The structure of the paper is as follows: The next section describes the
conceptual framework, introducing institutional theory, its approaches and the
four-layer model by Koppenjan and Groenewegen (2005). Thereafter there is
an institutional analysis, followed by a presentation of the governance and
management of the industry from the beginning of the sector or before the
reforms (decentralization era) to the present reform process (centralization
era). Furthermore, there is an analysis of specific policy directions and their
periods and the impact of reforms on the whole industry structure. Finally,
there is a discussion section and conclusions and policy recommendations.
2 Conceptualizing Institutional Evolution
On the theoretical and methodological level, there is no clear consensus among
modern researchers as to what would constitute an adequate or acceptable
explanation of the process of emergence of an institution. This applies from
the early works of Menger (1981) on the analysis of how institutions evolve to
Hodgson and Knudsen (2001). Williamson (2000), an internationally highly
rated contributor to new institutional economics, admits that “we are still
very ignorant about institutions”. On this tentative assumption, it is suggested
that the real world emergence of institutions is aided by the development
of concordant habits, particularly as a result of emerging channels and
constraints.
Institutional evolution can be better understood by examining the pro-
cesses of institutionalization of organizations. Institutionalization defines the
process where organizations obtain value and structures. An organization
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evolving or changing (thus developing values and structures) develops through
its confrontation with its immediate environment or society. This argument
is supported by Peters (2000) stating that an institution is a variable not a
constant and that different organizations are at different levels of institution-
alization. To effectively make sense in explaining or assessing the level of
institutionalization of an organization, we must set criteria for an institution
in its assumptive variable character.
Several criteria exist for assessing levels of institutionalization of an
organization. However, the basic similarity in all institutional criteria is
that something identified at a higher level is used to explain processes and
outcomes at a lower level of analysis (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Amenta
2005). Koppenjan and Groenewegen’s (2005) four-layer model of institutional
analysis as shown in Figure 1 presents a framework for assessing how
institutionalized a particular organization is. Huntington (1968) also showed
that the level of institutionalization of any organization can be measured
by autonomy, adaptability, complexity and coherence. For example, the
two models for assessing institutionalization according to Koppenjan and
Groenewegen (2005) and Huntington (1968) share similarities.
Autonomy represents the independence of the organization. How the
organization is able to make its own decisions outside its societal or political
Figure 1 Koppenjan and Groenewegen’s four-layer diagram of institutionalization.
Source: Koppenjan and Groenewegen (2005).
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influence. This is much related to the layer 3 of the Koppenjan and Groe-
newegen model, which takes a look at rules, laws and regulations that provide
such autonomy of an organization. A more institutionalized organization is
determined by how independent it is in decision making which is achieved
through the laws and rules that govern the organization and protect it in any
society.
Adaptability is a function of an institution’s environmental challenges
and age. Such challenges include the culture, norms and values of its new
immediate environment which are described in layer 4 of Koppenjan and
Groenewegen’s four-layer model. An organization can only survive if it can
adapt to the changing environmental challenges. For instance, regarding the
aspect of age, an older institution can be less adaptive than a dynamic young
institution. In general, the older an organization, the more rigid it is. Before an
organization can adapt well to new trends in the environment as was proposed
by Huntington, it is suggested that adaptability can be measured by the age of
the organization. An organization is said to be more institutionalized if it has
adopted one or more functions other than its primary function.
Complexity demonstrates the capability of the organization to manage
diversity in terms of products and functions. This is expressed through
corporations, agreements and arrangements as expressed in layer 2 of the
Koppenjan and Groenewegen model. The world has become a global village
now and such complexities are expected. A well-diversified organization is
more robust and likely to survive modernization than a simpler monotonous
organization.
Coherence can be measured by the cleavages between members of the
institution and its leadership. In layer 1 of the four-layer model, coherence is
expressed in terms of the interaction between actors and agents aimed at influ-
encing the provision of services. Huntington’s (1968) coherence emphasizes
the level of loyalty of the members of the institution.
3 Institutional Factors that Contributed to the Telecom
Reform Agenda
The four-layer model based on Koppenjan and Groenewegen (2005) presented
in Figure 1 provides a layered approach to analyzing institutions within the
Ghana telecom industry. Though it has been argued that the world is moving
towards a regulatory convergence through privatization and similar telecom
regulatory policies, the ways and means of achieving these goal vary according
to the structures and institutions of individual countries, and this paper presents
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the ways and means to telecom reform from Ghana’s perspective using the
four-layered framework.
3.1 Layer 1 – Actors and Agents in Socio-Technological System
The key actors and agents identified in the Ghanaian telecom transition are
the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the British Govern-
ment (former colonial masters), the Government of Ghana, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), international telecommunication giants, the
GP&T management and the Ghanaian public. The interaction between these
actors and agents determined the transition process and affected the nature
and output of the reform.
The World Bank, a major financier of the country’s economy and, in
particular, financier for most of GP&T’s capital expenditures, was interested
in the privatization of the GP&T because the model of telecom liberalization
was becoming successful in developed countries. Tobbin (2010) reported that
there was some suspicion as to the actual motive of the World Bank’s support
for privatization. In recent interviews performed by Alexander Osei-Owusu
with former managers of GP&T, they revealed that privatization was more
in the interest of the Western partners rather than Ghana, since it was an
opportunity for them to invest in such emerging market. “As to the benefit
to the economy of Ghana, perhaps one will say that it stands to gain, but the
timing of the whole process was wrong” was a statement from one former
manager of GP&T.
The interviewee argued that weak internal structures, Ghana’s young
democracy, and weak private sector participation meant that any privatization
at that time was likely to be managed by a foreign company. Contemporary
European experiences and models replicated in Africa would perhaps make
the work of the ITU easier than when having to deal with a more nationalized
sector where the national nature of it will prevent certain policies which may
not favor the government in power from being implemented.
The Government of Ghana (GoG) was to benefit from two fronts within this
reform process: 1) No more direct government investment for the management
of the GP&T once privatized, and 2) GoG was to control the industry through
the various arms of government notably MoTC (Ministry of Transport and
Communication), GFRCB (Ghana Frequency Registration and Control Board)
and the board of GP&T – a move which made GoG the principal beneficiary
of the telecom reform process, according to one interviewee.
The mismanagement of the GP&T was placed on the doorsteps of the
leadership or workers employed. For scoring political points and ambitions,
Policy Foundation of the Ghana Telecom Industry 51
political activists and party foot soldiers without requisite qualification were
employed to handle the industry, and this was the major cause of the acclaimed
inefficiencies of the management of GP&T. According to some interviewees,
these political activists who managed the GP&T teamed up with the GoG
and diverted incomes from GP&T meant for infrastructure investment into
other politically motivated national projects. Moreover, the inefficiency of the
telecom sector was also attributed to poor leadership, costing the government
huge sums of money, threatening to derail it from its economic recovery agenda
(Tobbin, 2010).
From the above discussions, a combination of poor performance of GP&T,
strong government manipulations (without opposition in parliament), weak
workers’ union and a general public apathy were the key endogenous factors
that led to the Ghanaian telecom reform.
3.2 Layer 2 – Formal and Informal Institutional
Arrangements
Agreements to liberalize the basic telecommunication market became part
of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations at the world trade organization
(WTO).At this time, Ghana had just moved into civilian government following
years of military rule. Several new policies were initiated by the new civilian
government in order to be in harmony with the international donor partners.
An initial Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) had not been successful in
reforming the utility sector. Ghana was just recovering from a great economic
recession in the 1980s, and in order to put the economy on track, the GoG
signed several binding agreements, assuring investors of liberalizing Ghana’s
market of which the telecom sector was no exception.
Ghana was credited for being one of the few African countries to sign
the Uruguay Round agreement in 1997. Some interviewees believe it was
a desperate situation of a country wanting to stimulate its economy back
on track after very long economic recessions. Other interviewees were of
the opinion that for building international trust, it was the best direction
of the newly constituted government. Even before the Uruguay Round
agreement in 1997 was signed, Ghana Telecom was incorporated in 1995
as a limited liability company separated from the postal services. And,
the same year witnessed the sale of the license for the Second Network
Operator (SNO) to Western Wireless, an American company. An important
implication of the Uruguay Round was to cut open the telecommunication
market of developing countries, especially for the companies in the developed
economy.
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3.3 Layer 3 – Formal Institutional Environment
From the early beginnings of the telecommunication industry, the colonial
masters took to a more micro management style of the industry, where
traditional leaders were made to secure and manage network transmission
lines with close supervision by the colonial masters. Later, the public work
department and municipalities were the managers of regional telecommu-
nication operations, reporting to the central government depending on the
arrangements.
Several agencies at the national level were assigned parts of the country’s
telecommunication industry to manage or regulate. Frempong and Atubra
(2005) laid the blame of the inefficiencies of the GP&T management to the
fact that regulation of the industry was divided among conflicting agencies
namely the GP&T, MoTC, Ministry of Finance, and GFRCB. This conflicting
task was what the reform process was meant to address. The creation of a
single national regulator (the NCA – National Communications Authority)
was the means to solve this problem.
Two major Acts of Parliament sought to provide independence for the
telecommunication industry management and this was part of the reform
process. In 1995, Ghana Telecom was established as a private limited liability
company separated from the postal section. And, the December 1996 NCA
Act 524 gave the regulator considerable autonomy and powers. However, such
independence, sought for by the Act of parliament was put into question since
the Ministry of Communication (MoC) was given oversight responsibility
over the activities of the regulator. According to some interviewees, even the
passage of the Act of parliament to grant full independence to a regulator
was passed under full pressure from the international community, and the
government has up till now violated the act by making the MoC oversee the
NCA. The recent impasse regarding the sale of government share of Ghana
Telecom to Vodafone by the former government and the current government
wanting to reverse the sale, provides evidence of the political interference
within the telecommunication industry in Ghana.
3.4 Layer 4 – Informal Institutional Environment
Ghanaians are very emotional and outspoken when it comes to matters of
national interest, and this nature is very common among most people ofAfrican
origin. Any government, who decides to sell a national asset, normally spells
doom for the government’s political prospect.
Ahortor (2004) posited that the main endogenous force against the priva-
tization of GP&T was the public’s view of GP&T as a national asset. Fear
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by government making the government of the day unpopular during the early
stages of privatization was a major factor why the then GoG did not totally
privatize but rather opted for a regulated sector with controlled private sector
participation.
Most political campaigns since 1992 have focused on the opposition
accusing the incumbent government of depriving the whole nation by selling
or privatizing national companies. The 2000 elections constitute evidence of
this when the then incumbent government, National Democratic Congress
(NDC), was accused of selling some of the state shares of the then Ghana
Telecom to foreign private firm. And, there were other examples, for instance
Pwalugu Tomato, Ejisu Jute factory and many more. Interviewees believed
and affirmed the general saying that ‘privatizing national companies were the
cause of the then government losing in the 2000 general elections’. The New
Patriotic Party (NPP) was then elected into power. However, they also faced
the same public discontent when they decided to sell the last owed government
share of the Ghana telecom (GT) to Vodafone in 2007, causing their shock
defeat in 2008 general elections after the then opposition NDC promised the
Ghanaian people a re-nationalization of GT, if voted into power. This and
many other examples depict how the Ghanaian political culture has greatly
affected the decisions concerning the telecom industry.
4 Overview of the Industry Governance and Management –
From Decentralization to Centralization
4.1 Decentralization of Governance (Mid-1800s to Mid-1900s)
Ghana’s telegraph lines were often cut down by superstitious locals. Among
the Ashanti communities, locals were convinced that the cables were ‘magic’
lines being used by the Europeans to win wars. To win the trust and provide
better security of the telecom lines, colonial governors entrusted the safety and
management of telegraph lines to tribal chiefs in 1886. Perhaps the colonial
masters had learned the Ghanaian culture so well that they knew that before one
can gain support to rule, one must involve them. From the institutional analysis,
once Ghanaians feel that their national assets are managed by foreigners there
is an antipathy and much public resentments. They will find a way to work
against the leadership and the project.
The decision to move management and governance of the telecom industry
by colonial masters to lower levels of government such as tribal or traditional
chiefs, district and municipalities etc. can be classified as a form of privati-
zation. This means that privatization has been tried and tested in the colonial
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days before renationalization. And, their support for liberalization may have
stem from earlier experiences.
Following the attainment of independence by Ghana in 1957, new tele-
phone exchanges were installed at every regional capital in Ghana, such as
Accra, Koforidua, Ho, Tamale, Sunyani and Kumasi. Management of these
exchanges or telephone lines was moved from tribal chiefs to newly created
public work departments at various municipalities or districts.
4.2 Centralization of Governance (Late-1900- to Present Day)
In the 1970s, telecommunications was administered by a single governmental
institution – the government’s Post and Telecommunications Department, a
department which was later declared a public corporation by the National
Redemption Council Decree No. 311 in 1974. The department was placed
under the authority of the Ministry of Transport and Communication, respon-
sible for policy formulation and the control of Ghana’s telecommunications
sector. This was said to be the beginning of the industry reform process.
5 Reform Process
The Ministry of Transport and Communications initiated the reform process of
the telecommunication sector by putting together a road map document called
the Accelerated Development Program (ADP) subsequently launched in 1994
(Ministry of Transport and Communications, 1999). The program document
was developed after an extensive consultation with telecom service providers,
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), financiers, donors and
users.
The ADP puts forward aims, policies and measures, which were to serve
as a foundation for a spearhead reform process and also address immediate
and foreseeable future challenges of the expected reformed telecom sector.
The policies and measures include 1) a tariff policy which was expected to
allow operators to recover the full cost of service provision, 2) that customers
should be able to access services at competitive and affordable prices, which
was in the direction of fostering public accessibility in urban and rural areas
through the implementation of payable facilities, 3) universal public access for
the longer term through the installation of payable facilities to every village of
a minimum of 250 inhabitants, 4) expanding the coverage of mobile services,
5) liberalization of value added services, 6) promoting Ghanaian ownership
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and control of telecommunications companies, and 7) retaining an overall
public regulatory control of the sector through the creation of a single and an
independent agency, the National Communications Authority (NCA).
The implementation of the ADP was expected to pave the way for the
denationalization and total liberalization of the telecom industry. The primary
means to achieve the above policies and objectives documented in ADP was
the establishment Ghana Telecom (in June 1995). This was to replace the then
telecommunications division of the Ghanaian Post and Telecommunication
Operator (PTO). According to a report by (Ghana Telecom, 2000), the newly
established operator, Ghana Telecom, did not have any positive effects on
either the profitability of the company or its supply of services.
To attract financial investment for the newly established telecommuni-
cations operator, a 30% share of Ghana Telecom was sold to a consortium
led by Telecom Malaysia Berhad. To introduce competition, the policy on
liberalization of the market called for a second network operator, creating a
duopoly. The second network operator similar to Ghana Telecom was also to
provide services both locally and internationally with a 20 year initial license.
The license for the operation of the second network operator was auctioned
at the same period when the 30% share of the incumbent (Ghana Telecom)
was sold to the consortium led by Telecom Malaysia Berhad. During the first
five years, the two carriers were to be given nationwide exclusive rights over
fixed line telecom services.
Retaining an overall public regulatory control was a means to achieving the
central objectives of the reform process as proposed by the ADP. The National
CommunicationsAuthority was thus established by anAct of Parliament, NCA
Act 524, 1996. The NCA was thus commissioned with the responsibilities
of achieving all the proposals within the ADP. Specific responsibilities is
presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Responsibilities of the NCA.
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6 Specific Policy Initiatives and Periods
After the launch of theADP and the establishment of the independent regulator
(NCA), series of policies were rolled out in phases in order to achieve the aims
of the Accelerated Development Program and also solve evolving challenges
of the industry.
6.1 Market Liberalization (1997–2007)
In order to achieve the ADP objectives of liberalizing the market, a duopoly
was created in December 1997 when Westel paid 10.5 million U.S. dollars
for the second network operating license. This opened a gate for more
liberalization of the cellular markets in Ghana (BMI-T, 1998). Figure 3 shows
how the telecom sector responded to the early days of liberalization.Aduopoly
market created in the fixed line telephony market and an oligopoly market in
the cellular telephony area (refer to Figure 3).
Figure 3 Market Liberalization.
Source: Mirrored from Frempong and Atubra (2001).
6.2 Infrastructure Expansion (2008–2014)
6.2.1 Infrastructure licensing
In Ghana, in tandem with global institutionalization of rights of ways
and it numerous benefits especially for unserved market areas and market
liberalization, The Electronic Communication Act was passed (Electronic
Communication Act 2008). The National Communications Authority (NCA)
awarded licenses for the provision of telecom infrastructure in the country.
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The act placed communications, networks and services under the rights of way
regulation or the statutory wayleaves to facilities and infrastructure, especially
to the passive infrastructure.
This many expert believe opened the door for the tower business in
Ghana. Tower operators were to build tower infrastructure and rent it out
to multiple network operators. The project was aimed at reducing cost of
building single infrastructure, leveraging competition among network opera-
tors while improving network coverage in remote areas, which under normal
circumstances would have been difficult for single operator investment. The
law was a response to the massive deficit of telecom infrastructure against the
backdrop of sections of the public discontent of not receiving telecom services
in some areas.
6.2.2 Emergence of tower companies
In January 2010, Millicom Ghana (Tigo Ghana) agreed to sell 750 base towers
to Helios Towers Ghana (HTG). The deal was the first major sales/leaseback
to be completed by the major African telecoms operator and an independent
tower company on the continent. Vodafone Ghana also signed a ten year deal
with Eaton Towers to take over the operations and co-location management
of its existing tower infrastructure. In the same year, 2010, MTN rounded
off a joint venture deal with American Towers. By September 2014, a press
release officially announcing an agreement for the divestment of over 3500
telecom towers from Airtel (across 6 countries in Africa) to Eaton Towers
(an independent tower operator) of which Airtel Ghana was part was issued,
bringing every major network operator on-board.
However, the emergence and growth of these infrastructures came with a
degree of public concern with health, safety and environment – though some
of these concerns particularly, with regard to health risk posed by cell towers
are not supported by existing scientific findings. That notwithstanding, it is
important through education and public awareness to address the concerns
of the public and also take appropriate action to harmonize growth and
development, on one hand, and public safety, perceived or otherwise, on the
other.
To facilitate tower growth and environmental sanity, an Inter-Ministerial
Committee (IMC) was inaugurated to champion the development and imple-
mentation of the existing solution framework. The IMC instituted an Indus-
try Technical Committee (ITC) headed by the National Communications
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Authority (NCA) to collaborate with industry and other stakeholders: Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), Ghana Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA),
Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC), Metropolitan, Municipal and
District Assemblies (MMDAs), and Radiation Protection Institute (RPI) to
develop a set of guidelines for the institution of a one-stop-shop permitting
scheme for the deployment of communication towers.
The Terms of Reference for the ITC are as follows: 1) Provide clear
standards and procedures for the installation of towers and also address the
issues of environmental sanity; 2) Formulate a cost-effective and efficient
mechanism to address administrative and bureaucratic bottlenecks faced by
operators; 3) Design a fair and open cost-based fee policy/structure which
would ensure that all operators are charged fairly by the relevant permitting
authorities; 4) Facilitate the development of infrastructure to enhance the
delivery of quality service and also promote the provision of competitive
and affordable services nationwide.
6.3 Consumer Protection (2010–2014)
6.3.1 Mobile Number Portability (MNP)
MNP is a system in which a mobile phone customer may change to a different
service provider while retaining his entire original mobile phone number,
including the old network code. One of the major aims of the NCAis to protect
the consumers, especially on quality of use of service and service provision.
The MNP policy allows customers to move to another mobile or network
provider without necessarily changing their mobile SIM number. Customers
normally port, due to quality of service issues or lack of a particular network
operator’s service in certain areas. The policy, which came into full force in
2010, was to put more pressure on the network operators to pay attention to
quality of service issues and also encourage them to spread their coverage if
they are to retain and also increase their customer base.
6.3.2 SIM card identification
The National Communications Authority (NCA) announced in July 2010 the
start of collection of information by all mobile phone operators aimed at
identifying existing and new subscribers to their respective networks. The
exercise was to enable the NCA and the mobile operators identify mobile
phone SIM cards/chips owners and curb incidents such as loss of phone
through theft, nuisance text messages, scams, threats, raising unnecessary
alarm or creating panic, deliberately or otherwise.
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Although this project was aimed to protect the consumer, one will say that
this particular project was seen as a more political project than a regulatory
project. In the run-up to the 2012 general elections, the country was so
much tensed with unidentified threat and panic messages circulating to some
political leaders and the general public. The then government blamed it
on their political foes, saying it was a scheme to make the government
unpopular. Some interviewees said that ‘the project was motivated by the
incumbent government to witch hunt political opponents and also tap in their
conversations for political gains’.
7 Impact of Reform Process and Policy Directions
on the Ghana’s Telecom Industry
The foundation of the various specific policy directions and the creation
of structures were to enhance quality of services provided by the telecom
industry. There was very strong public outcry and concern. As the institutional
analysis reveals, governments upon governments have always moved to
quench public outcry and concerns in order to win power or cult public support:
Putting structures to promote more private participation and infrastructure
development (which was expected to drive quality of service) while addressing
other public concerns related to health, safety and environment. Structures
and institutions to address these concerns were much dominating in industry
reforms.
In Figure 4, MoC still overseas the activities of the NCA. The emergence
of network towers brought so much public concerns especially on health
and safety issues; and environment pollution, the ITC was formed by the
government and includes institutions such environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Ghana CivilAviationAuthority (GCAA), Metropolitan, Municipal and
District Assemblies(MMDAs) and the Radiation Protection Institute (RPI) to
deal with these concerns. The NCA on its own overseas the NOs, EMs, PPIs
and ISPs and other functions established by an Act of Parliament, NCA Act
524, 1996.
Equipment standards and type approvals are administrative but technical
requirement for vendors, manufactures, dealers and network service providers
to proof that their communications equipment that are sold, used and meant
to be connected to the public networks have met the required national and
international standards. It is the mandate of the NCA under Section 3(n)
of NCA Act 769 of 2008 to authorize such approvals. Some equipment
manufacturers or vendors in Ghana include Ericson and Huawei.
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Figure 4 How the Ghana’s telecom industry looks today.
Source: Author’s.
NCA – National Communication Authority, EMs – Equipment Manufacturers, ITC – Industry Technical
Committee, EPA – environmental Protection Agency, GCAA – Ghana Civil Aviation Authority,
MMDA’s – Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies, NOs – Network Operator, IMC –
Inter-Ministerial-Committee, MoC – Ministry of Communication, MEST – Ministry of Environment,
Science and Technology, MLGRD – Ministry of Local government and Rural Development and the
Radiation Protection Institute (RPI).
8 Conclusions
The study has identified two major periods and the level of governance,
from the decentral period where management of the sector was transferred to
traditional/tribal leaders, later to municipalities/districts, to the centralization
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period where management has been solely in the hands of the Works and
Housing Department, and finally to the Ministry of Transport and Communi-
cation as the single national entity in charge of the management of the telecom
sector. An independent and national regulatory authority was created later to
lead the liberalization era.
The research also has shown three key policy directions across the period
of reform: Market liberalization (1997–2007) where Westel Limited was
introduced into the fixed line market, and Spacefon, Celltell and Mobitel all
were introduced into the cellular telephony market. At the beginning of 2008,
national policy was directed towards infrastructure expansion, and as a result,
infrastructure licensing was introduced opening the door for international
tower companies. From the beginning of 2011 up to date, policy is directed
at consumer protection and projects such as Mobile Number Portability and
SIM card identification have been rolled out.
The use of institutional theory has provided further understanding of the
sector reforms. The research of the institutional framework has identified poor
performance of GP&T, strong government manipulations (without opposition
in parliament), weak workers’ union and a general public apathy as the
key endogenous factors for reform. International bodies, donor communities
and other external agreement have been identified as exogenous factors. In
summation, the research has provided a better picture of how the Ghanaian
telecom industry looks today.
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